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Abstract
How can we generate a key to encrypt messages between two honest parties that an
eavesdropper does not gain any information about? The purpose of this thesis is to
give an overview over the current state of the prepare and measure quantum key dis-
tribution protocol and its security proof with a specific focus on the non-asymptotic
case. Therefor, we present the different steps of the protocol and retrace them with the
help of the BB84-protocol. Afterwards, the security proof of this protocol is introduced
and in the end, we have a closer look at the quantum capacity and calculate it for the
amplitude damping channel.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The requirement of secure communication is becoming more and more important.
Therefore, information theorists work on finding a way to make the exchange of in-
formation secure from adversaries. At this point, quantum mechanics has several
advantages over classical information theory since it is not a deterministic theory. As
Artur Ekert, who is known as one of the inventors of quantum cryptography, said in
1991, ”if nature cannot predict the result, neither can an eavesdropper“.
Using the properties of quantum mechanics, information theorists found various
applications of quantum information theory that would not be possible with clas-
sical information theory. One example is quantum money, a design of bank notes
that makes them impossible to forge, proposed by Stephen Wiesner in 1970. Another
application is building a quantum computer and finding algorithms where quantum
computers outperform classical computers.
In this thesis, we are going to investigate another application of quantum informa-
tion: quantum key distribution. Quantum key distribution is the process of creating a
key between two honest parties that an eavesdropper does not gain any knowledge of.
This key can later be used to encrypt messages and ensures a secret communication.
The goal of this thesis is to get an up-to-date overview of the prepare and measure
quantum key distribution protocol (in contrast to the entanglement based protocol) as
well as the security analysis with a specific focus on the non-asymptotic case.
Therefore, after stating the required mathematical preliminaries in chapter 2, we intro-
duce the field of entropies in chapter 3 and discuss the interpretation of the different
entropies with regard to quantum information theory. In chapter 4, we finally present
the several steps of the quantum key distribution protocol and retrace them with
the help of the well-known BB84 protocol, the first quantum cryptography protocol
developed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984 (see [BB84]). We explain
the quantum phase, where the quantum states are prepared and measured as well as
the classical post-processing that guarantees that the key is correct and secret. After
this, in chapter 5, two different approaches to the secrecy analysis of the protocols
are introduced: the way it was done in [TL15] and [SR08]. Here, the analysis of the
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1. Introduction
non-asymptotic case offers some specifics. In the last chapter, we have a closer look at
the quantum capacity, which is the highest rate at which quantum information can be
communicated over a noisy quantum channel. We calculate this quantity for a specific
channel, the amplitude damping channel that models noise in a quantum channel due
to energy loss.
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CHAPTER 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we will introduce some definitions and mathematical terms that will be
used throughout the thesis.
2.1. Notation
A Hilbert space on a system A is denoted HA and the product space of two Hilbert
spaces isHAB = HA ⊗HB. The set of operators on a Hilbert-spaceH is denotedB(H).
A set of quantum states (i.e. density operators) on the Hilbert-space HA is defined as
follows:
Definition 2.1 (Set of normalised states)
S=(HA) := {ρ ∈ P(HA) : Tr(ρ) = 1} (2.1)
where P(HA) is a set of positive semi-definite operators onHA, i.e. ρ ≥ 0.
For technical reasons, sub-normalised states are sometimes used instead of normalised
states.
Definition 2.2 (Set of sub-normalised states)
S≤(HA) := {ρ ∈ P(HA) : 0 ≤ Tr(ρ) ≤ 1} (2.2)
Note that these states have no physical interpretation, but can be thought of as norm-
alised states on a larger Hilbert spaceH ′A projected ontoHA.
11
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2.2. Distance measures
Distance measures play a crucial role in quantum information theory. They are typ-
ically used to measure the success/failure of a protocol, e.g. by comparing input and
output states, or to measure the distinguishability of quantum states. Particularly in
the non-asymptotic setting, distance measures are needed to define smooth entropies,
because they are evaluated on a quantum state ρ over a set of states -close to ρ (see
definition 3.11).
We are especially interested in a metric on S≤(HA) which will turn out to be the
purified distance. To define the purified distance, we need another distance measure,
the generalised fidelity:
Definition 2.3 (Generalised fidelity) For ρ, τ ∈ S≤(H), the generalised fidelity between ρ
and τ is
F(ρ, τ) := sup
H ′
sup
ρ˜,τ˜∈S=(H ′)
||√ρ˜√τ˜||1 (2.3)
where the supremum is taken over all embeddings V of H into H ′, and all normalised states
ρ˜, τ˜ ∈ S=(H ′) such that ρ and τ are images of ρ˜ and τ˜ under V†, i.e. the states satisfy
V†ρ˜V = ρ
V†τ˜V = τ.
The generalised fidelity can also be written in another way, as the following Lemma
shows.
Lemma 2.1 Let ρ, τ ∈ S≤(H). Then,
F(ρ, τ) = F(ρˆ, τˆ) = || √ρ√τ||1 +
√
(1− Tr(ρ))(1− Tr(τ)) (2.4)
where ρˆ := ρ⊕ (1− Trρ), τˆ := τ⊕ (1− Trτ).
Note that if at least one of the states ρ and τ are normalised states (i.e. Tr(ρ) = 1 or
Tr(τ) = 1), the traditional fidelity can be recovered.
Now, we can define the purified distance based on the generalised fidelity:
Definition 2.4 (Purified distance) For ρ, τ ∈ S≤(H) we define the purified distance
between ρ and τ as
P(ρ, τ) :=
√
1− F(ρ, τ)2. (2.5)
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2.2. Distance measures
The purified distance is a metric on the set of sub-normalised states S≤(H) (which is
shown in [Tom13], i.e.
• P(ρ, τ) = 0⇔ ρ = τ
• P(ρ, τ) = P(τ,ρ)
• The triangle inequality is fulfilled: P(ρ, τ) ≤ P(ρ, σ) + P(σ, τ).
Next, we introduce the generalised trace distance, which is a generalisation of the trace
distance for sub-normalised states.
Definition 2.5 (Generalised trace distance) For ρ, τ ∈ S≤(H), the generalised trace dis-
tance between ρ and τ is
D(ρ, τ) := max{Tr{ρ− τ}+,Tr{τ− ρ}+} (2.6)
where { }+ is the projection onto the positive eigenspace.
Note that we introduced two complementary ideas of comparing states:
• Fidelity: measures how close two states are
• Purified distance, generalised trace distance: measure how distinguishable two
states are
The main advantage of the purified distance is that we can always find extensions and
purifications without increasing the distance (for proofs, see [Tom13]).
Definition 2.6 (Purification) A purification of a state ρ ∈ HA is a pure state |ψ〉RA ∈ H ⊗
H ′ with
|ψ〉RA =
∑
x∈X
√
PX(x) |x〉R |x〉A (2.7)
such that ρA = TrR(|ψ〉 〈ψ|RA).
Theorem 2.1 (Uhlmann’s theorem for purified distance) Let ρ, τ ∈ S≤(H), dimH ′ =
dimH and |ψ〉 ∈ H ⊗H ′ be a purification of ρ. Then, there exists a purification |θ〉 ∈ H ⊗H ′
of τ such that
P(ρ, τ) = P(ψ,θ). (2.8)
Theorem 2.2 Let ρ, τ ∈ S≤(H) and ρ˜ ∈ S≤(H ⊗H ′) be an extension of ρ. Then, there exists
an extension τ˜ ∈ S≤(H ⊗H ′) of τ such that
P(ρ, τ) = P(ρ˜, τ˜). (2.9)
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2.3. Completely Positive Maps
In the quantum key distribution protocol, several steps are modelled with completely
positive trace preserving maps, which will be defined in the following. The definitions
are taken from [BL07].
Definition 2.7 (Linear, self-adjoint map) A linear, self-adjoint map  is a transformation
 : B(HA)→ B(HB) (2.10)
which
• is linear, i.e.,
(αO1 + βO2) = α(O1) + β(O2) ∀O1,O2 ∈ B(HA) (2.11)
where α, β ∈ C,
• and maps Hermitian operators onto Hermitian operators, i.e.,
(O†) = ((O))† ∀O ∈ B(HA). (2.12)
Definition 2.8 (Trace preserving map) A linear map  is called trace-preserving if
tr((O)) = tr(O) ∀O ∈ B(HA). (2.13)
Definition 2.9 (Positive map) A linear, self-adjoint map  is called positive if
∀ρ ∈ B(HA), ρ ≥ 0 ⇒ (ρ) ≥ 0. (2.14)
Definition 2.10 (Completely positive map) A positive linear map  is completely positive
if for any tensor extension of the form
′ = 1A ⊗  (2.15)
where
′ : B(HA ⊗HB)→ B(HA ⊗HC), (2.16)
′ is positive. Here, 1A is the identity map on B(HA).
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CHAPTER 3
Entropies
Entropies are an important tool in quantum (and classical) information theory. In gen-
eral, they measure how much uncertainty there is in a state of a physical system. In this
chapter, we are going to introduce the most important entropies that are used through-
out this thesis.
First, we have a look at entropies in classical information theory and in the asymptotic
i.i.d. setting, that means we just consider independent, identically distributed probab-
ility distributions, i.e.
PXn(xn) =
n∏
i=1
PX(xi) (3.1)
and an infinite number of trials.
To define a reasonable entropy, it is crucial that it fulfils certain axioms. First, we
consider the entropy of events (see [Ren10]):
• Independence of representation:
An entropy H(E) of an event E only depends on the probability P(E) of that
event.
• Continuity:
The function H is continuous in the probability measure P.
• Additivity:
For two independent events E and E′, the function H fulfils H(E∩ E′) = H(E) +
H(E′).
This is reasonable, because two independent events should not have an influence
on each other’s uncertainty.
• Normalization:
H(E) = 1 for E with P(E) = 12 .
This axiom ensures that the uncertainty of an event is maximal if the probability
for an event is 12 , i.e. we have no information about it.
15
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The only function that fulfils all these axioms is
i(PX(x)) := − logPX(x) (3.2)
which is shown in [Ren10] (the logarithm is always taken to the base two). With these
axioms, it is now possible to define an entropy of a random variable.
3.1. Shannon entropy
The entropy of a random variable X only depends on the probability mass function PX,
analogously to the entropy of an event.
The most standard measure in classical information theory is the Shannon entropy. The
Shannon entropy of a random variable X quantifies how much information we gain,
on average, if we learn the value of X (which is equivalent to the uncertainty that we
have about an event before the measurement).
It is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Shannon entropy)
H(X) = E[i(PX(x))] = −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) · logPX(x) (3.3)
where X is the alphabet, i.e. the values that the realisation x of X can assume.
Apart from the axiomatic justification, it is crucial that an entropy has an operational
interpretation. The operational interpretation of the Shannon entropy is that H(X) is
the optimal compression rate of a source or random variable X. For the proof, the weak
law of large numbers (W.L.L.N.) and the asymptotic equipartition property (A.E.P.) are
used, so at this point it is important that we are in the i.i.d. and asymptotic setting (see
[Sha48],[CT06]).
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3.2. Conditional entropy
3.2. Conditional entropy
The general idea in quantum information theory is pictured in figure 3.1.
"channel"X Y
random variable 
(Alice)
random variable 
(Bob)
x y
Figure 3.1.: General QIT setting
Alice sends a realization x ∈ X over a channel to Bob and he receives some informa-
tion y ∈ Y. Now, Bob would like to learn the value of X, knowing Y (i.e. Y is some
side information). We would like to quantify Bobs uncertainty about X, given Y. The
conditional entropy gives us a value of this uncertainty.
To get an expression for this entropy, we first consider a particular realisation y ∈ Y.
Then, the entropy H(X|Y = y) of a random variable X conditioned on y is:
H(X|Y = y) = EX[− logPX|Y(x|y)]
= −
∑
x∈X
PX|Y(x|y) · log(PX|Y(x|y))
With this result, we can find an expression for the conditional entropy:
H(X|Y) = EXY[− logPX|Y(x|y)]
=
∑
y∈Y
PY(y) ·H(X|Y = y)
= −
∑
y∈Y
PY(y)
∑
x∈X
PX|Y(x|y) · log(PX|Y(x|y))
= −
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PX,Y(x, y) · logPX|Y(x|y)
where PX,Y(x, y) is the joint probability mass function (note that if X and Y are inde-
pendent random variables, PX,Y(x, y) = PX(x) · PY(y)).
Finally, the expression we found for the conditional entropy is
H(X|Y) = −
∑
y∈Y
x∈X
PX,Y(x, y) · logPX|Y(x|y) (3.4)
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3.3. Relative entropy and mutual information
Relative entropy is useful to quantify how far one probability distribution PX1(x) is
from another PX2(x).
Relative entropy is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Relative entropy)
D(PX1(x)||PX2(x)) =
∑
x∈X
PX1(x) · log
(
PX1(x)
PX2(x)
)
(3.5)
This is a useful quantity in its own right, but it can be used to derive other quantities,
for example mutual information.
Mutual information quantifies how much information two random variables X and
Y have in common. It is given by the relative entropy between the joint probability
PX,Y(x, y) of X and Y and the individual probabilities PX(x), PY(y), i.e.:
Definition 3.3 (Mutual information)
H(X : Y) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PX,Y(x, y) · log
(
PX,Y(x, y)
PX(x)PY(y)
)
(3.6)
Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the different entropies ([NC00]):
Figure 3.2.: Relationship between entropies
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3.4. Classical min- and max-entropy
3.4. Classical min- and max-entropy
So far, we always considered the asymptotic case. Now, we want to study entropies
for the non-asymptotic case and allow a small probability of failure.
In this case, we cannot use the Shannon entropy anymore, because its operational
interpretation depends on the i.i.d./asymptotic setting. Reasonable entropies in the
non-asymptotic case are the min- and the max-entropy (see [Tom13]).
Definition 3.4 (Max-entropy)
Hmax(X)P := log
∑
x∈X
√
PX(x)

2
. (3.7)
This entropy can be further refined by smoothing it:
Consider some probability distributions QX that are close to PX and fulfil
Hmax(X)Q ≤ Hmax(X)P. (3.8)
Here, ”close“ means that the QX are in a statistical distance  of PX:
D(PX,QX) :=
1
2
∑
x∈X
|PX(x) −QX(x)| ≤ . (3.9)
The smooth max-entropy is now the infimum over all QX that are -close to PX (in the
following denoted by ≈):
Hmax(X)P = infQ≈PHmax(X)Q. (3.10)
The smooth max-entropy is used to optimize the Gallagher bound, which is a bound
on the minimum code length m(X)P, for which exists an encoder and a decoder that
achieve a probability of failure P ≤ :
m(X)P ≤ H1max(X)P + log 12 + 1 (3.11)
where  ≤ 1 + 2.
Definition 3.5 (Min-entropy)
Hmin(X)P = min
x∈X (− logPX(x)). (3.12)
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The classical min-entropy is used for randomness extraction. The smoothing part here
works the same as the one for the max-entropy.
For applications, the conditional version of the min-entropy is more interesting. To
get an expression for that, we consider the min-entropy with the joint probability
distribution:
Hmin(X|Y)P = − log
∑
Y
PXY(x
y
∗ , y)
 (3.13)
where xy∗ is the x that maximizes PXY for a given y. The sum in this expression can be
written as ∑
Y
PXY(x
y
∗ , y) =
∑
Y
PY(y)max
x∈X
PX(x)
=
∑
Y
PY(y) · 2log(maxx∈X P
y
X(x))
=
∑
Y
PY(y) · 2−Hmin(X)Py
With this result, the conditional min-entropy is
Hmin(X|Y)P = − log
∑
Y
PY(y) · 2−Hmin(X)Py
 (3.14)
where Hmin(X)Py = log(maxx∈X P
y
X(x)) can be considered as the min-entropy of X
evaluated for the conditional probability distribution
PYX(x) =
PXY(x, y)
PY(y)
. (3.15)
The conditional min-entropy Hmin(X|Y) can be interpreted as a guessing probability in
tasks such as the following:
Consider an observer with access to Y. We are interested in the probability that this
observer guesses X correctly. The optimal strategy is to guess the x with the highest
probability conditioned on his observation y. The (average) guessing probability is
then given by ∑
Y
PY(y) ·max
x∈X
PYX(x) = 2
−Hmin(X|Y)P . (3.16)
.
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3.5. Quantum entropy
3.5. Quantum entropy
To find an expression for the entropy in the quantum case, it is crucial to take the two
different types of uncertainty into account: The classical uncertainty as well as the
quantum uncertainty from the uncertainty principle. Since both types of uncertainty
are covered by the density operator, a quantum entropy should be a direct function
of the density operator analogously to the classical measurement of uncertainty (see
Definition 3.1).
Definition 3.6 (von Neumann entropy) Suppose that Alice prepares some quantum system
A in a state ρA. Then the entropy H(A) of the state is as follows:
H(A) := −Tr
{
ρA logρA
}
(3.17)
The quantum entropy has several mathematical properties (for proofs, see [Wil13b]):
• Positivity:
For any density operator ρ, the von Neumann entropy is non-negative:
H(ρ) ≥ 0. (3.18)
• Minimum value:
H(ρ) = 0⇔ ρ is a pure state. (3.19)
• Maximum value:
When d denotes the dimension of the system, the maximum value is given by
log d and
H(ρ) = log d⇔ ρ is the maximally mixed state. (3.20)
• Concavity:
The entropy is a concave function in the density operator:
H(ρ) ≥
∑
x
PX(x)H(ρx) (3.21)
where ρ =
∑
x PX(x)ρx. This property ensures that entropy never decreases un-
der a mixing operation.
• Unitary Invariance: The von Neumann entropy is invariant under unitary oper-
ations:
H(ρ) = H(UρU†) (3.22)
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It is now easy to define different quantum entropies in terms of the von Neumann
entropy:
Definition 3.7 (Joint quantum entropy)
H(AB)ρ = −Tr
{
ρAB logρAB
}
(3.23)
Definition 3.8 (Conditional von Neumann entropy) The conditional quantum entropy
H(A|B)ρ of a bipartite quantum state ρAB is the difference of the joint quantum entropy
H(AB)ρ and the marginal H(B)ρ:
H(A|B)ρ = H(AB)ρ −H(B)ρ (3.24)
3.6. Quantum min- and max-entropy
Finally, we have a look at the quantum versions of the min- and max-entropy.
What we are actually interested in is the smooth conditional min-entropy. The max-
entropy can later be expressed in terms of the min-entropy. Therefore, we first have a
look on the definition of the quantum conditional min-entropy:
Definition 3.9 (Quantum conditional min-entropy) Let ρAB ∈ S≤(HAB) with HAB =
HA ⊗HB. The min-entropy of A conditioned on B of the state ρAB is
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σ
sup
{
λ ∈ R : ρAB ≤ 2−λ1A ⊗ σB
}
(3.25)
where the maximum is taken over all states σ ∈ S≤(HB).
Note that there exists a feasible λ only if supp{ρB} ⊆ supp{σB}. If this assumption is
fulfilled, the supremum is achieved by
λ∗ = − log ||σ−
1
2
B · ρAB · σ
− 12
B ||∞. (3.26)
The conditional min-entropy can thus be written as
Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
σ
{
− log ||σ− 12B · ρAB · σ
1
2
B ||∞
}
. (3.27)
The next step is smoothing this entropy. For this step, we will need the definition of an
-ball:
Definition 3.10 (-ball) Let ρ ∈ S≤(H) and 0 ≤  ≤
√
Tr(ρ). We define the -ball of
operators onH around ρ as
B(H ;ρ) := {τ ∈ S ≤ (H) : P(τ,ρ) ≤ } (3.28)
where P(τ,ρ) is the purified distance between τ and ρ.
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3.7. Entropic uncertainty relation
Now, we can use this -ball for the smoothing parameter of the smooth entropies:
Definition 3.11 (Smooth min-entropy)
Hmin(A|B)ρ = maxρ˜ Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ (3.29)
where the optimization is taken over an -ball of states ρ˜ close to ρ.
Now, we would like to have an expression for Hmax as well. Therefore, we use the
duality relation between Hmin and Hmax: Let ρABC ∈ S ≤ (HABC) be pure. For  > 0,
Hmin(A|B)ρ = −Hmax(A|C)ρ. (3.30)
The quantum conditional smooth min-entropy is a useful quantity for the secrecy ana-
lysis in the non-asymptotic case, see Lemma 5.1.
3.7. Entropic uncertainty relation
The uncertainty principle plays a central role in quantum mechanics. The fact that en-
tropic uncertainty relations are indeed desirable was first mentioned by David Deutsch
in [Deu83]. We present a version of the entropic uncertainty relation that is used in
[TL15] to proof the security of the qkd protocol (see theorems 5.1 and 5.2).
Theorem 3.1 Let τABCP ∈ S(ABCP) be an arbitrary state with P a classical register. Fur-
thermore, let  ∈ [0, 1) and let q be a bijective function on P that is a symmetry of ρABCP in the
sense that ρABC,P=p = ρABC,P=q(p) for all p ∈ P. Then, we have
Hmin(X|CP)σ +Hmax(X|BP)σ ≥ log
1
cq
, (3.31)
where cq = maxp∈Pmaxx,z∈X ||Fq(p),xA (F
p,z
A )
†||2∞. Here, σXBCP =MA→X|P(τABCP) for the map
MA→X|P[·] = TrA
∑
p∈P
∑
x∈X
|x〉X
(
|p〉 〈p|P ⊗ Fp,xA
)
·
(
|p〉 〈p|P ⊗ Fp,xA
)† 〈x|X
 (3.32)
and any set (indexed by p ∈ P) of generalized measurements {Fp,xA }x∈X.
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CHAPTER 4
QKD protocol
In quantum key distribution, two authorized partners (traditionally called Alice and
Bob) who want to establish a secret key are connected by two channels: A quantum
channel that allows Alice to send quantum signals to Bob and a classical channel,
where Alice and Bob can send classical messages back and forth.
An eavesdropper, named Eve, can interact with the signals on the quantum channel,
but if she does, the signals are changed due to the no-cloning theorem (see [Wil13b]). In
contrast to the quantum channel, the classical channel is required to be authenticated,
that means that Eve can listen to all communication but cannot change the messages.
The general QKD protocol includes several steps. In this part we follow the steps listed
in [TL15]. To get an idea of how such a protocol works, we retrace the different steps
on the basis of the BB84 protocol (see [NC00], [SBPC+09], and [BB84]).
4.1. Quantum phase
The first step is the quantum phase, in which Alice prepares quantum states and sends
them to Bob over the quantum channel.
State Preparation
For the state preparation, Alice randomly choses a string r of lenght M with r ∈ {0, 1}M.
The state ρR then has the form
ρR =
1
2M
∑
r∈{0,1}M
|r〉 〈r|R (4.1)
where {r} is an orthonormal basis of R.
Alice prepares a state by using the map
P∅→A|RSΦA (·) =
∑
r,φ∈{0,1}M
(
|r〉 〈r|R ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|SΦA
)
·
(
|r〉 〈r|R ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|SΦA
)
⊗ ρr,φA (4.2)
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where ρr,φA =
⊗M
i=1 ρ
ri,φi
Ai
. A is Alice’s initial quantum system and SΦA a random seed
for choosing the random bit string φ (for more details about random seeds, see [TL15]).
After applying the map, the resulting state is
ρRSΦAA =
1
4M
∑
r,φ∈{0,1}M
|r〉 〈r|R ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|SΦA ⊗ ρr,φA (4.3)
In the BB84 protocol, Alice starts with two strings of random classical bits, a and b, each
of length (4+ δ)n. She encodes these strings as a block of (4+ δ)n qubits:
|ψ〉 =
(4+δ)n⊗
i=1
|ψaibi〉 (4.4)
where ai is the ith bit of a and similar for b. Every qubit is in one of the four states
|ψ00〉 = |0〉
|ψ10〉 = |1〉
|ψ01〉 = |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2
|ψ11〉 = |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2
Note that the basis in which ai is encoded is determined by the bit bi. If bi is 0, ai
is encoded in the computational basis, for bi = 1 in the Hadamard basis. After the
encoding, the qubits are in states which are not all mutually orthogonal, which means
it is impossible to distinguish between all of them with certainty without knowing b.
State distribution
After the state has been prepared, Alice sends it to Bob over the quantum channel
N : A→ B. B is Bob’s initial quantum system. Bob receives the state
ρRSΦAB = NA→B(ρRSΦAA)
=
1
4M
∑
r,φ∈{0,1}M
|r〉 〈r|R ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|SΦA ⊗ ρr,φB (4.5)
with ρr,φB = N(ρ
r,φ
A ).
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4.2. Sifting phase
Measurement
To choose the basis he measures in, Bob uses a random string ΦB. The outcomes of
his measurements are either 0, 1, or ∅ for inconclusive measurement results, for ex-
ample due to a photon loss. Bob stores these outcomes in a string T ∈ {0, 1, ∅}M. The
measurement map he uses is
MB→TΩ|SΦB (·) =
∑
φ∈{0,1}M
∑
t∈{0,1,∅}M
|t,ω〉TCΩ
(
Mφ,tB ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|SΦB
)
·
(
Mφ,tB ⊗ |φ〉 〈φ|SΦB
)† 〈t,ω|TCΩ
(4.6)
where ω = ω(t) is the subset of [M] where t takes values in {0, 1} (i.e. no inconclusive
results), namely
ω(t) = {i ∈ [M] : ti , ∅}. (4.7)
In the BB84 protocol, Bob receives a state E(|ψ〉 〈ψ|), where E represents the quantum
operation on the state due to the noise of the channel and the interaction of an eaves-
dropper. At this point, Alice, Bob and Eve each have their own states. Note that since
Alice is the only one who knows b, Eve has no knowledge of what basis she should
have measured in to eavesdrop the communication. She can only guess, but if her
guess was wrong, she would have disturbed the state received by Bob.
Of course, Bob has no knowledge of b either, but he measures each qubit in one of the
bases, determined by a random bit string also of length (4+ δ)n, called b′. After the
measurement, Bob holds a bit string a′.
4.2. Sifting phase
In the sifting phase (which is optional), Alice and Bob agree to discard some symbols.
First, Bob publicly announces SΦB , i.e. the bases he measured in, and the set Ω of
indices corresponding to conclusive measurement results. After that Alice applies the
sifting map
sift :
{0, 1}M × {0, 1}M × 2[M] → ΠM,m × {⊥, 6⊥}(ΦA,ΦB,Ω) 7→ (Σ,Fsift) (4.8)
where Σ is the subset of Ω of cardinality m where ΦA and ΦB coincide, if such a set
exists and the flag Fsift is set to 6⊥. Otherwise, it is set to ⊥ and the protocol aborts.
In the BB84 protocol, after Alice has announced b, she and Bob discard those bits
in {a′,a}, that Bob measured in a different basis than Alice, which means that the cor-
responding bits of b′ and b are not equal. After this step, the remaining bits satisfy
Bachelor thesis - Ramona Wolf 27
4. QKD protocol
(in the ideal case) a′ = a. With high probability, there are 2n bits left (δ can be chosen
sufficiently large).
So far, Alice and Bob have no information if there is an eavesdropper in their com-
munication. To check how much information has been leaked to Eve, Alice selects a
random subset of n bits, announces them and compares their values to Bob’s values
of the checkbits. If more than an acceptable number of them disagree, they abort the
protocol.
4.3. Classical Post-Processing
After the sifting phase, the classical post-processing starts. The collected data is estim-
ated and transformed into a secure key (for more details, see [Bea14], [Duh15]). This
step is performed during the BB84 protocol as well, but it depends on the channels that
are used and there are often several ways to perform these steps so we will just present
how these steps work in general.
Parameter estimation
Parameter estimation is the first classical post-processing step. In the parameter es-
timation phase, Alice and Bob want to gain some statistical knowledge about their
strings to figure out how many errors have occurred and to get an idea of how much
information an eavesdropper may have about their strings.
For that purpose, Alice sends a small sample of her string to Bob. He compares it
to his own string and announces the error rate he observes. From this error rate of
the small sample Alice and Bob can get bounds on the number of errors of the whole
string (see [Bea14], [Ser74]).
If the estimated error rate is too high, Alice and Bob have to abort the protocol (i.e. they
set the flag ⊥), because an eavesdropper may have gained so much information that
it is impossible to get a secure key even with a high amount of privacy amplification.
Otherwise, they set the flag 6⊥ and continue.
Information reconciliation
After parameter estimation, Alice and Bob know what error rate their strings hold
and start to correct these errors. Their aim is to communicate a minimal amount of
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information to each other to fix the errors.
Information reconciliation may be a probabilistic procedure, i.e. with high probab-
ility it corrects all errors but with a small probability it does not. Hence, Alice and
Bob have to check if the procedure was successful and therefore, they need to send
a small amount of information over the classical channel. The simplest strategy is to
compare hashes of their strings, i.e. they randomly choose a function of a family of
two-universal hash functions and apply it to their strings.
Definition 4.1 (Two-universal Hashing) Let H = {h} be a family of functions from X to
Z. The familyH is said to be two-universal if Pr[H(x) = H(x′)] ≤ 1Z for any pair of distinct
elements x, x′ ∈ X, when H is chosen uniformly random inH .
If their hashes differ, Alice and Bob abort the protocol.
Privacy amplification
After the information reconciliation step is done, Alice and Bob hold the same strings.
Now, they have to remove any information an eavesdropper may have about their
shared string. Therefore, they need to send information over the classical channel. The
shorter Alice and Bob make their string, the more secure it will be.
Basically, this step is done by using randomness extractors. A randomness extractor
is a function that takes a source of randomness as an input (e.g. a string with a lower
bound on its entropy) and a small uniformly random seed. It generates an almost
uniformly random output which is longer than the seed. Furthermore, for the applic-
ation in quantum key distribution, it is crucial that this randomness is extracted with
respect to a quantum adversary and additionally the seed and the output string should
be independent of each other (so that even if Eve gets access to the seed, she has no
information about the output). Altogether, we want a strong randomness extractor
against quantum adversaries, that is defined in the following (from [Bea14]):
Definition 4.2 (Quantum-Proof Strong Randomness Extractor) A (k, )-strong quantum-
proof randomness extractor, Ext, is a function from {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d to {0, 1}m if for all classic-
quantum states ρXE with a classical X ∈ {0, 1}n with min-entropy Hmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k and a
uniform seed Y ∈ {0, 1}d we have
1
2
||ρExt(X,Y)YE − 12m ⊗ ρY ⊗ ρE|| ≤  (4.9)
One example of randomness extractors used in QKD are universal hash functions as
defined in definition 4.1. In privacy amplification, Alice and Bob randomly choose a
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hash function which they both apply on the keys they hold after the information recon-
ciliation step. The fact that universal hash functions make good randomness extractors
is ensured by the leftover hashing lemma ([TL15]):
Lemma 4.1 (Leftover Hashing Lemma) Let σXE′ , ˜σXE′ ∈ S≤(XE′) be classical-quantum
states and let H be a two-universal family of hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}l. Moreover,
let ρSH =
∑
h∈H 1|H| |h〉 〈h|SH be fully mixed. Then,
||ωKSHE′ − χK ⊗ωSHE′ ||1 ≤ 2−
1
2 (Hmin(X|E′)σ˜−l) + 2||σXE′ − σ˜XE′ ||1 (4.10)
where χK = 12l idK is the fully mixed state and ωKSHE′ = trX(E f (σXE′ ⊗ ρSH)) for the function
f : (x, h) 7→ h(x) that acts on the registers X and SH.
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CHAPTER 5
Secrecy analysis
When generating a key in quantum key distribution, not only the protocol itself is
important, it is also crucial to analyse the security of the key. Several failure probab-
ilities occur in the process that have to be taken into account (e.g. during information
reconciliation). In the non-asymptotic scenario, some special characteristics arise that
we are going to investigate in this chapter.
5.1. Definition and proof of security
In general, the security of a protocol (respectively a key) can be expressed in terms of
its deviation from a perfect protocol, i.e. one that outputs a uniformly distributed key
that is completely independent of the knowledge an eavesdropper has. Therefore, we
define a security parameter
∆M,k,n,δ,sift,ec,pa := sup
NA→BE
1
2
||qkd_PMM,k,n,δ,sift,ec,pa(NA→BE)−qkd_idealM,k,n,δ,ec,pa(NA→BE)||1
(5.1)
with the channel as input.
To be secure, a protocol has to fulfil two aspects: correctness and secrecy. Correctness
means, that the probability that the protocol is not aborted (i.e. the flags at parameter
estimation and error correction are set to 6⊥) though the keys differ is sufficiently low,
i.e.
Pr[KA , KB ∧ Fpe = Fec = 6⊥] ≤ ec. (5.2)
Secrecy refers to the fact, that the deviation of the actual key from a perfect key is
sufficiently low either:
Pr[Fpe = Fec = 6⊥] · 1
2
||ωKASCFE|F=( 6⊥,6⊥) − χKA ⊗ωSCFE|F=( 6⊥, 6⊥)||1 ≤ pa (5.3)
Then, the security parameter satisfies ∆ ≤ ec + pa.
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The following theorems ensure that the protocol fulfils both aspects, correctness and
secrecy. The first one refers to correctness:
Theorem 5.1 For every state ρABE and ωKAKBSCFE =qkd_simplek,n,δ,ec,pa(ρABE) we have
Pr[KA , KB∧ = ( 6⊥, 6⊥)]ω ≤ ec := 2−t (5.4)
The second theorem asserts secrecy:
Theorem 5.2 Define
pa(ν) := 2−
1
5 (n log
1
c¯−nh(δ+ν)−s−t−l) (5.5)
where h is the binary entropy function
h : x 7→ −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x). (5.6)
If (0) < 1, define ν∗ as the unique solution of the equality
pa(ν) = exp
(
− nk
2ν2
2(n+ k)(k+ 1)
)
. (5.7)
If furthermore, this solution satisfies pa(ν∗) ≤ 14 , then, for every state ρABE and ωKAKBSCFE =
qkd_simplek,n,δ,ec,pa(ρABE), we have
Pr[F = ( 6⊥, 6⊥)]ω · 12 ||ωKASCFE|F=( 6⊥, 6⊥) − χKA ⊗ωSCFE|F=( 6⊥, 6⊥)||1 ≤ pa(ν∗) (5.8)
In [TL15], these theorems are proved which leads to the proof of the security of the
protocol. Therefore, they first proof the security of the simple and rather unrealistic
entanglement based protocol. Then, they make several assumptions to trace the proof
of the prepare and measure protocol back to the one of the entanglement based pro-
tocol. The heart of their proof is the entropic uncertainty relation that was already
mentioned in chapter 3.7.
In [SR08], they have a slightly different acces to the security of the protocol. They
require two properties of a key: First, the characteristic of the non-asymptotic scen-
ario is that this deviation  from a perfect key is always finite and therefore needs an
operational interpretation to make it possible to find reasonable security thresholds.
Additionally, another relevant requirement in practical QKD is the composability of
the key which guarantees that the generated key can be safely used in applications.
The following definition considers both conditions, composability and the operational
interpretation of .
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5.2. Non-asymptotic analysis
Definition 5.1 (-secure key) For any  ≥ 0, a key K is said to be -secure with respect to an
adversary E it the joint state ρKE satisfies
1
2
||ρKE − τK ⊗ ρE||1 ≤  (5.9)
where τK is a completely mixed state on K.
The operational interpretation of the parameter  in this definition is that it can be seen
as the maximum probability that K differs from a perfect key, or equivalently as the
maximum failure probability of the protocol.
It is also easy to see why this definition is composable: Consider a cryptosystem that
uses a perfect key. By replacing the perfect key with an -secure key, its failure probab-
ility only increases by at most .
5.2. Non-asymptotic analysis
This analysis is based on [SR08]. Among other aspects, it gives a bound on the final
key length l, that already appeared in equation 5.5 and an expression for the sifted key
rate r′ in the non-asymptotic case.
In the asymptotic case, i.e. the size of the raw key tends to infinity, the quality of
a protocol is commonly expressed in terms of the sifted key rate r′, defined as
Definition 5.2 (sifted key rate)
r′ := lim
n→∞
l(n)
n
(5.10)
where l(n) is the number of generated key bits and n is the size of the raw key.
Under the assumptions of collective attacks, the sifted key rate can be written in terms
of the conditional von Neumann entropy:
r′ = H(X|E) −H(X|Y) (5.11)
i.e. the sifted key rate is equal to the difference between Eve’s uncertainty on the raw
key bits X and Bob’s uncertainty. Multiplying the sifted key rate r′ with nM yields to the
key rate per signal r. In many schemes in the asymptotic case, nM can be chosen arbit-
rary large to 1, so the sifted key rate r′ and the key rate per signal r are asymptotically
equal.
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However, in the non-asymptotic case, the number of exchanged signals M is always
finite. There are several deviations from the asymptotic case, e.g. in parameter es-
timation or information reconciliation where one needs to find a trade-off between
the length of the key and the precision of the post-processing. The aim is to find an
expression for the sifted key rate r′ analogously to the asymptotic case.
The first step to derive such an expression is finding a bound on the number of fi-
nal key bits l:
Lemma 5.1 The protocol described above generates an -secure key if, for some ¯ ≥ 0
l ≤ H¯min(Xn|En) − leakEC − 2 log
1
2(− ¯− EC) (5.12)
where leakEC is the amount of information leaked during information reconciliation.
By evaluating the smooth min-entropy and taking into account that the states have to
be in a set compatible with the statistics from the parameter estimation, we can find an
expression for r′:
Lemma 5.2
r′ = Hξ(X|E) − (leakEC + ∆)/n (5.13)
with Hξ(X|E) = minσX¯E¯∈Γξ H(X|E) and ∆ = 2 log 12(−¯−EC) + 7√n log(2/(¯−¯′)) (with the
assumption ¯ > ¯′). Γξ is a set of states compatible with the statistics λ(a,b) from parameter
estimation.
Several errors from different sources occur in this expression:
•  is the probability that the key differs from a perfect key
• EC is the failure probability of the information reconciliation, i.e. that Bob com-
putes a wrong guess for Xn
• ¯ is the smoothing parameter of the min-entropy (see lemma 5.1)
• ¯′ is the probability that the set Γξ is not compatible with the statistics λ(a,b)
Note that M, , leakEC and EC are parameters that are implemented in the protocol
whereas n, m, ¯ and ¯′ have to be chosen to maximize the key rate per signal r =
(n/M)r′ under the constraints n+m ≤M and − EC > ¯ > ¯′.
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CHAPTER 6
Quantum capacity
After studying the QKD protocol and its security in detail, we have a look at one im-
portant quantity for the communication over quantum channels: the quantum capa-
city. The quantum capacity is the highest rate at which quantum information can be
communicated over a noisy quantum channel. This implies that the requirement for
the key rate r for a secure communication is
r ≤ Q(N) (6.1)
where the error  tends to 0 as n tends to infinity.
In general, the quantum capacity of a quantum channel is the supremum over all
achievable rates for quantum communication, i.e. sup{Q|Q is achievable}. It was
shown by Lloyd ([Llo96]) Shor ([Sho02]) and Devetak ([Dev05]), that the quantum
capacity can be expressed as
Q(N) = lim
n→∞
1
n
Q(1)(N⊗n) (6.2)
with the single-letter expression
Q(1) = max
φAA′
{I(A〉B)ρ : ρ = (id⊗N)φ} (6.3)
where the maximum is taken over all pure, bipartite states φAA
′
.
What makes it difficult to calculate the quantum capacity is the fact that, in general, the
coherent information is non-additive, which leads to the fact that the quantum capacity
can be non-additive ([SY08]):
Q(N1 ⊗N2) > Q(N1) +Q(N2) (6.4)
Therefore, we are having a look at a specific class of channels with some useful prop-
erties.
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6.1. Degradable channels and quantum capacity
We are especially interested in the quantum capacity of degradable channels since they
are the only ones whose quantum capacity is known, which was shown in [DS08].
Definition 6.1 (Degradable channel) A degradable quantum channel is one for which there
exists a degrading map T B→E so that for any input state ρA:
(N c)A→E(ρA) = T B→E(NA→B(ρA)) (6.5)
In brief, degradable channels are such that the receiver can simulate the channel to the
environment by applying a degrading map to the channel output. Figure 6.1 shows a
schematic of a degradable quantum channel. |φ〉 is the input state, |ϕ〉 the output state
and environment state and |ψ〉 the state shared between A′ (the reference system), F
and the two copies of the environment system, E and E′ (see [MW13]).
U
VBA
E
E'
F
A'
|ϕ
|φ |ψ
Figure 6.1.: Schematic of a degradable quantum channel
For degradable channels, the copies of the environment system, E and E′ are the same,
which leads to the fact that the coherent information becomes additive, which is a
crucial requirement for the following theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.1 (Quantum capacity for degradable channels) For degradable channels, the
quantum capacity is given by
Q(N) = max
ρAB
I(A〉B) (6.6)
where I(A〉B) is the coherent information
I(A〉B)ρ = H(B)ρ −H(AB)ρ. (6.7)
For the proof of this theorem, see [DS08]. With this result, the quantum capacity is
given by a single letter formula which makes it possible to calculate this quantity.
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6.2. Amplitude damping channel
6.2. Amplitude damping channel
One interesting channel is the amplitude damping channel. It models noisy quantum
channels due to energy loss. One physical interpretation is thinking of the |0〉 state as
the ground state of a two-level atom and the |1〉 state as the excited state of this atom.
The amplitude damping channel models spontaneous emission, i.e. the transition from
the excited state to the ground state that occurs with a probability of 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, as
shown in figure 6.2.
0  0 0  0
1  1 1  1
1
1-γ
γ
Figure 6.2.: Interpretation of the qubit amplitude damping channel
The amplitude damping channel can be described by the Kraus operators:
E0 =
(
1 0
0
√
1− γ
)
(6.8)
E1 =
(
0
√
γ
0 0
)
(6.9)
The channel acts on a state ρ =
(
a b
b∗ 1− a
)
in the following way:
EAD(ρ) = E0ρE†0 + E1ρE†1 =
(
a+ (1− a)γ b√1− γ
b∗
√
1− γ (1− a)(1− γ)
)
(6.10)
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6.3. Calculation
To calculate the coherent information for the amplitude damping channel EAD, we use
the following formula:
I(A〉B)σ = H(B)σ −H(AB)σ
= H(EAD(ρ)) −H(E)σ
= H(EAD(ρ)) −H(EcAD(ρ))
(6.11)
where ρ is a pure input state
ρ =
(
1− a b∗
b a
)
(6.12)
and σ is the state that Bob receives:
σ = EAD(ρ) =
(
1− a(1− γ) b√1− γ
b∗
√
1− γ a(1− γ)
)
. (6.13)
For the calculation, we also need to know how the complementary channel EcAD acts
on ρ. Therefore, we use an isometric extension of the channel and then trace over Bob’s
system. The amplitude damping channel is of the form
EA→BAD (ρA) =
∑
j
E jρAE†j . (6.14)
and therefore, its isometric extension is given by the following map
UA→BEEAD =
∑
j
E j ⊗ | j〉E (6.15)
=

0
√
γ
1 0
0 0
0
√
1− γ.
 (6.16)
Now we apply this map to the input state ρ:
UA→BEEAD (ρ) =

aγ b∗√γ 0 a√1− γ√γ
b
√
γ (1− a) 0 b√1− γ
0 0 0 0
a
√
1− γ√γ c√1− γ 0 a(1− γ)
 . (6.17)
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Tracing over Bob’s system gives us the complementary channel:
EcAD(ρ) = TrB(UA→BEEAD (ρ)) (6.18)
=
(
1− aγ b∗√γ
b
√
γ aγ
)
(6.19)
During the calculation, we will also need to calculate the entropy of the states,
H(A)ρ = −Tr(ρ logρ) (6.20)
= −
∑
i
λi logλi (6.21)
where λi are the eigenvalues of the state. These eigenvalues are
λ±B =
1
2
(
1±
√
((1+ 2a(γ− 1))2 − 4|b|2(γ− 1)
)
(6.22)
λ±E =
1
2
(
1±
√
(1− 2aγ)2 + 4|b|2γ
)
. (6.23)
Currently, the coherent information is still a function of two variables, a and b (with
fixed error parameter γ). It can be shown (as in [Wil13a]) that it is sufficient to con-
sider only diagonal density operators to maximize the coherent information. Thus, the
eigenvalues in 6.22 and 6.23 become
λ±B = {(1− γ)a, 1− (1− γ)a} (6.24)
λ±E = {γa, 1− γa} (6.25)
Now we have all the information we need to calculate the coherent information which
is hence only a function of a. In figure 6.5, this is diagrammed for different values of γ.
For γ < 0.5, the coherent information is concave and therefore a maximum exists. For
γ = 0.5 the coherent information vanishes, which can be easily understood since the
eigenvalues of Bob ( 6.24) and Eve ( 6.25) become the same. For γ < 0.5, the coherent
information is negative, which is clear because in that case Eve gets more information
than Bob.
In order to calculate the quantum capacity, we take the maximum of the coherent in-
formation over a. In figure 6.4, the coherent information with its particular maximum
(the quantum capacity) is shown for several values of 0.1 ≤ γ ≤ 0.5. The coherent
information can now be evaluated as a function of γ, which is shown in figure 6.5. As
expected, the quantum capacity decreases as the error parameter γ increases.
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Figure 6.3.: Coherent information as a function of a, for different γ
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Figure 6.4.: Coherent information with quantum capacity, for different γ
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6.3. Calculation
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Figure 6.5.: Quantum capacity Q(N) as a function of γ
In [GF05], the quantum capacity was calculated for Amplitude damping qubit chan-
nels and in [WPG07], the quantum capacity has been calculated for all qubit channels
that can be represented by two Kraus-Operators.
The analysis of the quantum capacity leads to the question what happens if the key
rate goes above this capacity, respectively if the strong converse theorem holds for the
quantum capacity. Strong converse means that if the rate r goes above the capacity
Q(N), the error  tends to 1.
It was proved in [MW13] for degradable channels that if the rate goes above the
quantum capacity, the error jumps to 1√
2
which is called the ”pretty“ strong converse.
For a smaller class of channels (the generalized dephasing channels), the full strong
converse was proved by [TWW14].
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and outlook
In this thesis, we presented the quantum key distribution protocol and gave an over-
view of the security proof as well as expressions for quantities like the final key length
and the key rate. Furthermore, we examined a special class of channels, the degrad-
able channels, and especially the amplitude damping channel, that models noise in
a quantum channel. For this channel, the quantum capacity was calculated and dia-
grammed.
Still, there are some open problems that are worth being investigated. We already
mentioned the open tasks concerning quantum capacity. Since the strong converse
theorem was only shown for degradable channels for an error of 0 ≤  ≤ 1√
2
, it is open
to show a full strong converse for degradable channels and later the strong converse
for other types of channels.
Another interesting task is to calculate the final key length that appears in theorem 5.5
or the (sifted) key rate in the non-asymptotic case as in lemma 5.2. These could be
evaluated for different channels, for example the amplitude damping channel.
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APPENDIX A
Notation
⊥ Abort symbol
6⊥ Passing symbol
M Number of states sent by Alice
[M] Set {1, 2, ...,M}
n Length of the raw key
k Length of the raw key used for parameter estimation
l Length of the final key
r key rate per signal
r′ sifted key rate
s Length of the error correction syndrome
t Length of the hash used for verification in the error correcting scheme
δ Threshold for the parameter estimation test
NA→B Quantum channel between Alice and Bob
MA→X|S Measurement map applied on register A with setting S and storing the result in X
P∅→A|RS Preparation map that returns a state in register A depending on the setting RS
Mφ,xAi Measurement operator acting on Ai with the setting φ and outcome x
ci Parameter quantifying the quality of the measurement on register i
c¯ Parameter quantifying the overall quality of the measurement
A Alice’s initial quantum system
B Bob’s initial quantum system
E Eve’s system
SΦA Seed for the choice of Alice’s measurement bases
SΦB Seed for the choice of Bob’s measurement bases
S Register corresponding to all the seeds
Fpe Flag for the parameter estimation test
Fec Flag for the error correction test
Fsi f t Flag for the sifting procedure
F Register corresponding to all the flags: F = (Fpe,Fec,Fsi f t)
C Register containing all the transcripts
R Register of Alice’s raw key
T Register for Bob’s measurement results
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Ω Subset of [M] for which Bob gets conclusive measurement results
Σ Subset of m indices where Alice and Bob’s settings agree
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